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Organizational ingenuity and the paradox of embedded agency: 
The case of the embryonic Ontario solar energy industry 
 
 
 
We examine organizational ingenuity within the paradox of embedded agency where 
organizational stakeholders are constrained in their behaviors by institutions, yet also influence 
and change these institutions. In this study organizational ingenuity represents the agency 
component and institutional constraints the embedded component. We build theory about 
ingenuity from a four-year case study of the embryonic Ontario solar industry. There were two 
major institutional constraints, limited grid access and political uncertainty. These led to four 
ingenuity strategies that emerged at different times and levels of analysis that challenged, 
complied with, or escaped the constraints. We combine these findings to develop a process 
model of the emergence of ingenuity in this embryonic industry. Lastly, we find that extending 
legitimacy to an ingenuity strategy is necessary for its success.  
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Introduction 
Organizational ingenuity is an emerging construct in management research that encompasses 
innovative activity within institutional constraints (Lampel, Honig, & Drori, 2011). As an 
emerging construct, it requires both theoretical analysis and qualitative research to refine its 
definition, formulate propositions, and examine its empirical applicability (Kaplan, 1964; 
Suddaby, 2010a). Since ingenuity takes place within institutional constraints (Lampel et al., 
2011), we draw from institutional theory to orient our research (Suddaby, 2006).  
 We connect ingenuity to two related puzzles in institutional theory concerning how 
stakeholders interact with the institutional environment. One puzzle involves the tension between 
top-down and bottom-up processes in the creation, maintenance, and change of institutions 
(Scott, 1994, 2008). The second puzzle is the paradox of embedded agency, which considers how 
institutional change is possible, given that stakeholders are constrained by the very institutions 
they seek to change (Garud, Hardy & Maguire, 2007; Seo & Creed, 2002; Zietsma & Lawrence, 
2010). In both puzzles, existing institutional constraints place top-down pressure on stakeholders 
to conform, a process known as institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), whereas 
stakeholders often seek to change these constraints from the bottom-up. Although organizing to 
change institutions is a component of institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988; Dorado, 
2005, Perkmann & Spicer, 2007), ingenuity is unique because it also includes entrepreneurial 
innovation within structural constraints (Lampel et al., 2011), and these innovations and the 
organizations creating them must have legitimacy from the institutional environment (Van de 
Ven & Garud, 1989). There has been little empirical attention to how stakeholders in embryonic 
industries use bottom-up processes when facing powerful institutional constraints (Van Dijk, 
Berends, Jelinek, Roome & Weggeman, 2011; Scott, 2008; Suddaby, 2010b). Accordingly, we 
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address the following research question: How does organizational ingenuity play a role in the 
paradox of embedded agency within an embryonic industry?  
 We answer our research question using a longitudinal case study of the embryonic solar 
energy industry in Ontario during 2009-12 with data from interviews of 22 industry stakeholders 
and 91 media articles. We use these data to identify our three main constructs of interest, 
organizational ingenuity, institutional constraints, and legitimacy, and we develop a process 
model that tracks their evolution over time.  
 Our study addresses a number of central topics regarding ingenuity and its linkages to 
institutional theory. First, we find that Oliver’s (1991) set of responses to institutional processes 
is a useful way to conceptualize types of ingenuity strategies and thus contribute to the construct 
clarity and underlying nature of ingenuity (Suddaby, 2010a). In so doing, we show that these 
ingenuity strategies are linked to business innovation and entrepreneurial action and occur at 
different levels of analysis (Lampel et al., 2011). Second, we identify a condition for the 
development of ingenuity (Lampel et al., 2011), specifically when successful innovation 
ironically engenders institutional constraints. Third, we examine the dynamics of organizational 
ingenuity (Lampel et al., 2011) by showing how ingenuity strategies and their legitimacy evolve 
over time. In so doing, we contribute to the understanding of dynamic behavior of entrepreneurs 
facing top-down institutional forces (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Greenwood et al., 2002; Perkmann 
& Spicer, 2007; Scott, 2008; Suddaby, 2010b). 
We proceed as follows. First, we review the literature on ingenuity and the paradox of 
embedded agency; this sets the theoretical context for our case study (Strauss & Corbin 1998; 
Suddaby 2006). Second, we discuss our methodology, including our research context, the data, 
and the analyses. Third, we present our findings organized around the induced process model of 
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ingenuity. Fourth, we discuss the implications for researchers, policy-makers, and managers, 
followed by a brief conclusion.  
 
Theoretical Foundations 
Ingenuity 
There is little research conceptualizing ingenuity. We adopt the definition presented by the 
editors for this special issue titled Discovering Creativity in Necessity: Organizational Ingenuity 
under Institutional Constraints: Ingenuity is “the ability to create innovative solutions within 
structural constraints using limited resources and imaginative problem solving” (Lampel et al., 
2011, p. 458). Ingenuity takes place within institutional constraints, and it involves adapting to 
existing constraints, developing new domains of action, and/or changing the constraints (Lampel 
et al. 2011). Ingenuity is closely aligned yet different from creativity, innovation and agility. We 
define each in turn then differentiate them from ingenuity. 
Creativity is defined as “the production of novel and useful ideas in any domain” and 
innovation as the “successful implementation of creative ideas within an organization” (Amabile 
et al., 1996, p. 1155). What sets innovation apart from creativity is its implementation within 
organizations. Creativity can thus be viewed as a first step to innovation. Innovative ideas need 
not be new to the world but must perceived as new to the people and can include new products, 
processes, markets, supplies, and organizations (Rogers, 1983; Schumpeter, 1986; Van de Ven, 
1986). Ingenuity is “the ability to create innovative solutions” and it incorporates not only 
producing novel, useful ideas but also implementing them. Therefore, creativity and innovation 
are necessary – but not sufficient – parts of ingenuity. The final parts of ingenuity are the 
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presence of structural constraints and stakeholders with limited resources innovating within these 
constraints.  
Agility is defined as “a firm’s ability to cope with rapid relentless and uncertain changes 
and thrive in a competitive environment of continually and unpredictably changing 
opportunities” (Lu & Ramamurthy, 2011, p. 932). Researchers predominantly in management of 
technology (e.g., Sambamurthy, Bharadwaj & Grover, 2003) and strategy (e.g., Goldman, Nagel 
& Preiss, 1995; Roth, 1996; Sull, 2010) have been preoccupied with strategic agility because this 
concept deals with firm success. Ingenuity bears some resemblance to strategic agility primarily 
through its focus on ability. Agility focuses less on particular ideas and more on adapting to a 
changing, uncertain, and competitive environment. In contrast, ingenuity focuses more on ideas 
implemented in the context of a constraining institutional environment, which may or may not be 
changing (Lampel et al. 2011).  
The paradox of embedded agency in institutional theory 
Institutional theorists have demonstrated how, when constrained by institutional forces, 
organizations tend to become similar over time (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Heugens & Lander, 
2009; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). We define institutional constraints as limitations or restrictions 
on the behavior of stakeholders (Seo & Creed, 2002; Scott 2008). Initial research focused on 
how stakeholders are relatively passive recipients of constraints (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Mezias, 1990). In subsequent research, stakeholders were conceived as actively pursuing 
interests and thus had varying responses to institutional pressures (DiMaggio, 1988; Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006; Oliver, 1991; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007; Scully & Meyerson, 1996; Zietsma & 
Lawrence, 2010). Seo and Creed (2002) theorized that potential change agents would mobilize 
and exhibit collective action to change institutions.  
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These two areas of investigation have been labeled the paradox of embedded agency 
where stakeholders are constrained in their behaviors by institutions, yet they also influence and 
change institutions (Garud et al., 2007; Seo & Creed, 2002). The paradox of embedded agency is 
a theoretical framework that incorporates both top-down and bottom-up institutional 
development. Given that ingenuity takes place within institutional constraints (Lampel et al., 
2011), we propose that ingenuity is important to the bottom-up efforts of stakeholders in the 
paradox of embedded agency.  
Although no research to date has examined the role of ingenuity in the paradox of 
embedded agency, research examining institutional entrepreneurship provides some insights. 
Institutional entrepreneurship is the examination of industry stakeholders as drivers of 
institutional change (DiMaggio 1988; Dorado 2005; Garud, Jain & Kumaraswamy 2002; Rao 
1998). As Perkmann and Spicer (2007) point out, research in institutional entrepreneurship has 
found that stakeholders can drive change through the formation of collaborations (DiMaggio 
1988; Dorado 2005), through the identification of cause and effect relationships (Greenwood et 
al., 2002; Strang & Meyer 1993), and the importance of legitimizing change (Creed, Scully & 
Austin, 2002; Lounsbury, Ventresca & Hirsch, 2003; Rao 1998).  
Not only is legitimizing change important, maintaining legitimacy is also a central 
concern for stakeholders who face institutional constraints (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Greenwood 
et al., 2002; Suchman, 1995). We define legitimacy as the generalized acceptability of an entity 
or practice within a social system (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy is 
important because it enables an entity to obtain necessary resources, reduce uncertainty, and 
ultimately enhance survivability (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Drori & 
7	  
Honig, 2013; Suchman, 1995). Because ingenuity occurs within institutional constraints, it is 
important to consider the legitimacy of ingenious stakeholders and their actions. 
 We examine four types of legitimacy in our study: pragmatic, moral, cognitive, and 
regulative. Suchman (1995) divided legitimacy into three categories: pragmatic, moral and 
cognitive. Pragmatic legitimacy addresses the question: what’s in it for me? Its assessment is 
based on self-interest. Moral legitimacy addresses the question: what’s in it for society? Its 
assessment is based on normative approval and the promotion of social welfare. Cognitive 
legitimacy is described as passive acceptance and the absence of questions (Meyer & Scott, 
1983; Suchman, 1995). Scott (1994) also divided legitimacy into three categories: regulative, 
normative, and cognitive. For our purposes, his conceptualizations of normative and cognitive 
types are sufficiently similar to the moral and cognitive dimensions of Suchman (1995). The 
addition of regulative legitimacy represents acceptability to the rules and procedures of 
authoritative bodies, most commonly the state. As such, regulative legitimacy is indicative of a 
top-down institutional constraint.  
 
Method 
Qualitative methodology 
There is limited research on the subject of organizational ingenuity, and our research question 
asks: How does organizational ingenuity play a role in the paradox of embedded agency within 
an embryonic industry? Given this, we used a qualitative case study methodology because it is 
appropriate when examining “how” and “why” questions in a novel setting that facilitate 
building new theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009). Our case is the 
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embryonic Ontario solar energy industry, a part of the broader energy industry. We used 
interviews and an analysis of media reports to address our research question. 
We first describe our research context. We then explain how we collected and analyzed 
our interview and media data. We conclude this section by discussing how we developed our 
process model of ingenuity strategies emerging over time in response to institutional constraints. 
Research context 
We examined the embryonic solar energy industry in Ontario from January 2009 to July 2012. 
This setting was appropriate for answering our research question because the industry essentially 
began in 2009 when the Ontario government passed the Green Energy Act (GEA) and we 
observed ingenuity within embedded agency. Our case is consistent with Eisenhardt and 
Graebner’s (2007) recommendation to select cases that are particularly suited to investigating 
constructs of interest and the relationships among them. 
With a population of 17 million people, Ontario is the most populous province in Canada. 
The province is plagued with increasing energy demands and limited nonrenewable resources 
and, therefore, arguably stands to gain the most from investment in renewable sources of energy. 
Consequently, the province proceeded aggressively with an agenda to promote investment in 
renewable energy (solar, wind and biomass). In February 2009, the Liberal government of 
Ontario passed the GEA that permitted renewable energy to contribute up to seven percent of the 
province’s energy needs. The GEA was created to spur investment in renewable energy, 
encourage energy conservation, and create jobs. A key component of the GEA is the Feed-in-
Tariff (FIT) program, which is the first comprehensive FIT program in North America (Ontario 
Ministry of Energy, 2012). The program allows homeowners, organizations, and private 
developers to generate renewable energy and sell it at guaranteed rates for a fixed term to the 
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Ontario Power Authority (OPA), a crown corporation responsible for the entire electricity system 
of the province. The heart of the solar energy industry is in southwestern Ontario. At latitude 
42.2° North, Essex County is the southernmost tip of Canada and receives the most powerful 
sunlight in the country. The city of Windsor in Essex County is the leading regional city and 
home to many of the solar energy entrepreneurs.  
Interviews 
We conducted two waves of interviews. The first was in June-July 2011. At this point in time, 
the fate of the GEA was an important issue in the fall provincial election, which created 
considerable political uncertainty (described below). The second wave of interviews was in June-
July 2012, after the Liberal government was re-elected and made some changes to the GEA. This 
allowed us to learn more about the evolution of the initial ingenuity strategies and the 
development of new ingenuity strategies in response to the few changes in government policy. 
 Our initial sample of participants was selected based upon our knowledge of the industry 
gleaned through media coverage of influential Ontario solar industry stakeholders. From this 
sample, we used the snowball technique. We conducted 12 interviews in summer 2011. All 12 
participants were asked for a follow-up interview in June 2012. One had left the industry after 
his firm went bankrupt; six were not available; and five spoke to us again. We also interviewed 
10 more people identified through the snowball technique. Our sample contained participants 
from various stakeholder groups and was reflective of the population because it included most of 
the main players in the regional solar cluster. Participants were either the highest ranked 
individual at the organization or the highest ranked individual within the Canadian operation of a 
multinational company. Table 1 provides general, non-identifying information on our 
participants, including the organization they worked for, their position within the organization, 
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and when they were interviewed. Interviewing various stakeholders with diverse and sometimes 
conflicting perspectives reduced the likelihood of convergent sense-making and impression 
management and thus gave us a comprehensive understanding of the industry (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). Furthermore, interviewing diverse stakeholders helped offset biases or lapses 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Van Dijk et al., 2011). Lastly, through our media analysis we 
ascertained that most of the major players in the regional solar energy industry were interviewed.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 Our interviews were conducted as follows. We asked semi-structured questions centered 
on the nature of the person and the organization he or she worked for, the institutional 
constraints, and the responses to these constraints. The interviews ranged from just under one 
hour to nearly two hours. All interviews were recorded and transcribed.  
 Two of the authors and a research assistant subsequently analyzed the interviews using 
NVIVO 9. We coded the data according to conceptualizations of institutional constraints and 
ingenuity. Our analysis included topic intensity and topic commonality among the participants. 
Institutional constraints were coded in terms of political, environmental, social, and 
technological categories. These were general barriers faced by the solar industry that were 
external and difficult to control. We coded ingenuity as any creative and useful idea that was 
innovatively implemented while operating under institutional constraints. Specifically, any new 
strategy that had yet to appear in the Ontario solar industry that was developed in response to the 
identified institutional constraints was coded as organizational ingenuity. Coding ingenuity in 
this way permitted us to examine the successes (i.e., the strategy resulted in either a change to the 
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constraints or enabled stakeholders to escape them) and failures (i.e., the strategy neither 
changed the constraints nor helped stakeholders escape them). This is in contrast to identifying 
ingenuity after constraints had been modified or avoided, which would have limited our analysis 
to successful strategies only. Our longitudinal analysis of the Ontario solar industry from its birth 
to its current state enabled us to determine if a strategy was novel and innovative. In addition, it 
enabled us to determine if the strategy was successful within the time period examined. We 
resolved discrepancies through discussion (Margolis & Molinsky, 2008). 
Media articles 
We conducted a content analysis of all articles about solar energy in The Windsor Star, the 
largest daily newspaper in southwestern Ontario. Reading these articles enhanced our 
understanding of the industry. Our content analysis allowed us to further examine the evolution 
of the institutional constraints, organizational ingenuity, and legitimacy over the study period and 
to triangulate with our interview findings. Following Bansal and Clelland (2004), a single source 
of media data was used to avoid duplicate news. 
 In 2009 and 2010, The Windsor Star published only four articles about the solar industry. 
However, from January 2011 to July 2012, it published 87 articles, for a total sample of 91. This 
demonstrated the rapid and growing importance of the embryonic solar industry. Indeed, the 
intensity of media coverage increased dramatically as solar energy became a provincial election 
issue. We obtained this sample of articles from the Canadian Newsstand Database provided by 
ProQuest using the key word “solar”. Originally we also included the key word “renewable,” but 
a large number of irrelevant articles, such as wind energy, accompanied this term.  
In a review of the literature on the operationalization of legitimacy, content analysis of 
media articles was a common method of measurement (e.g., Barron, 1998; Brown & Deegan, 
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1998; Deephouse, 1996; Lamertz & Baum, 1998). Our use of The Windsor Star to measure 
legitimacy was bolstered by the fact that it enjoys one of the highest readership penetrations in 
Canada – 80 percent (Newspaper Audience Databank, 2012), so that news about the solar energy 
industry would reflect and influence the attitudes of area residents (Deephouse, 1996).  
 The first two authors coded the newspaper articles and any discrepancies were resolved 
through discussions. Each article was coded in terms of: 1) whether or not it conferred legitimacy 
and how it did so; 2) if and how organizational ingenuity was mentioned; and 3) if and how 
institutional constraints were mentioned. Constraints and ingenuity were coded in the same way 
as in the interview data. Of the 91 articles, 44 discussed institutional constraints, and 35 
discussed organizational ingenuity. Legitimacy was coded for each article (Bansal & Cleland, 
2004; Lamertz & Baum, 1998). Any article that discussed the solar industry in a positive or 
neutral manner was coded as conferring legitimacy; any article that discussed the solar industry 
in a negative manner was coded as questioning the legitimacy of the industry (Deephouse, 1996; 
Meyer & Scott, 1983). Of the 91 articles, 65 articles in our media analysis conferred legitimacy, 
and 26 did not.  
Model development  
We used the interview and media data to develop a process model of the development of 
ingenuity strategies in the Ontario solar industry. This model included the identification and 
conceptualization of top-down institutional forces, bottom-up ingenious responses, and their 
emergence over time. In developing this model, we considered the applicability of different 
theoretical frameworks regarding the interaction of stakeholders with institutional forces (e.g., 
Oliver, 1991; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007; Scully & Meyerson, 1996; Seo & Creed, 2002). We 
also applied research on the development of legitimacy, especially for new industries (e.g., 
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Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Drori & Honig, 2013; Scott, 1994; Suchman, 
1995). Each author developed conceptualizations and process models and sent them for review 
by the other authors. We developed an initial model after the first wave of interviews in 2011 and 
discussed it with the second round of interviewees in 2012. In our analyses of the data, we found 
that Oliver’s (1991) framework of strategic responses to institutional processes helped position 
our data in theory (Suddaby, 2006). Consequently, we incorporated some of her terms into our 
conceptualizations. We converged after many iterations to the findings we present next.  
 
Findings 
Figure 1 presents the induced process model (Langley, 1999; Van de Ven, 2007). It 
depicts the relationships between the top-down institutional forces and bottom-up organizational 
ingenuity at four different levels of analysis in the Ontario solar energy industry from 2009-
2012. We identified five strategies, one institutional constraint, and one institutional enabler that 
turned into an institutional constraint. We present these chronologically.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Industry Emergence: Institutional enabling and entrepreneurial innovation 
 Institutional enabler: Grid access. The implementation of the GEA allowed renewable 
energy to provide up to seven percent of the power to the Ontario electric distribution system, 
commonly referred to as “the grid”. This legally sanctioned grid access was a top-down 
institutional force that enabled renewable energy to be part of the province’s energy sources, 
whereas previously renewables could not exist at a sufficient scale. This legal permission 
provided regulatory legitimacy to the solar energy industry that was important for its emergence 
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(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Scott, 1995). Cognitive legitimacy existed in that the ability and desire for 
renewable energy to contribute up to seven percent of energy demand was not questioned as 
evidenced in the media data (Meyer & Scott, 1983; Suchman, 1995).  
 Compliance strategy. In response to this institutional change, a variety of entrepreneurs 
entered the market between 2009 and 2010 to manufacture and install solar panels. These 
entrepreneurs were innovative because they successfully implemented new ideas in new 
organizations in new markets (Schumpeter, 1986; Van de Ven, 1986). Some adapted 
manufacturing facilities used in the auto industry. We termed this a compliance strategy (Oliver, 
1991), in that entrepreneurs accepted the institutional rules and created new firms to take 
advantage of the opportunities the rules provided. This was not an ingenuity strategy because 
firm resources were not limited and institutional rules were not constraining (Lampel et al., 
2011). 
The compliance strategy generated considerable energy and economic impact. Investment 
in the renewable energy industry was substantial ($26 billion in private investments from 2009-
2011). Where only a few thousand clean energy jobs existed previously, over 20,000 jobs were 
created, 8,000 within solar energy (Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2012). By July 2012, 
approximately 2,500 renewable projects were approved, producing enough energy to power 1.2 
million homes (Sorensen, 2012). The ten largest solar farms in the country were built in Ontario, 
making the province the leading solar energy producer in Canada; the 80 MW Sarnia Solar 
project is the largest operational solar photovoltaic farm in the world, generating enough energy 
to power approximately 12,000 homes a year (Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2012). The ability to 
create jobs and provide electricity from solar panels in Ontario enabled the industry to gain 
pragmatic legitimacy by providing jobs and income from electricity generation to buyers of solar 
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panels. Pragmatic legitimacy was evident in news about economic issues, such as job creation, 
business growth, and new markets (e.g., Hall, 2011a Macaluso, 2011; Pearson, 2011), and 
political issues, such as the role of renewable industry in the re-election of the government (Hall, 
2011d). 
This ability also addressed societal concerns about the environment and employment 
(McAllister Opinion Research, 2010). Solar energy was portrayed as a clean and renewable 
source of energy providing societal benefits through reduced greenhouse gas emissions and 
dependency on fossil fuels. Accordingly, moral legitimacy was evidenced by news about the 
environment (clean, renewable energy, for example, Wolfson, 2011a), and society (local 
University expertise, solar panels on schools, community centers, religious buildings, houses, 
and government and corporate buildings, for example, Hall, 2011c). Another important benefit 
was the thousands of jobs already created by the solar industry and the promise of more in the 
future. The endorsements of local, public and private organizations that purchased solar panels 
also bestowed moral legitimacy as these were viewed as “progressive” organizations which took 
the lead in the future of clean energy in Ontario.  
The seven percent limit for renewable energy specified in the GEA was reached in less 
than a year, however. One reason why this happened so fast was that large, well-financed wind 
companies moved in quickly, and the smaller solar firms were left scrambling for the remaining 
grid access. With the Ontario government refusing to increase the limit, the seven percent 
maximum changed from enabling the industry to constraining it. This resulted in an 
environmental jolt for the renewable energy industry (Meyer, 1982). A second institutional 
constraint emerged as well, political uncertainty. We address these two constraints that 
engendered ingenious responses in the next section.  
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Institutional constraints  
We identified two main institutional constraints from our data. The first was limited grid access, 
the inability of solar producers to connect to the grid. This theme was discussed by all 22 
interviewees (100%) and coded 61 times; it appeared in six media articles out of 91 (6.5%). The 
second institutional constraint was political uncertainty. This theme was discussed by 16 
interviewees (73%) and coded 46 times; it appeared in 38 of the 91 media articles (42%). Both 
constraints were evident immediately following the introduction of the GEA in February 2009. 
Limited grid access. Interviewees agreed that connecting to the grid was the hot button 
issue in the Ontario solar industry. Participants in both waves of interviews were quick to express 
their frustrations with the limit, often within the first few minutes of the interview. For example: 
“A lot of what’s holding the industry back right now is the connectivity to the grid…that’s really 
holding back this kind of massive explosion in Ontario right now.” 
 A consistent reason given for the lack of grid access was the failure to transition from a 
centralized to a decentralized energy system. The existing centralized generation and distribution 
functions of the current Ontario electricity industry created barriers to grid access. One 
participant noted: 
When any country decides to get into renewable energy there is a change in concept from 
centralized generation of energy to decentralized; that puts a great strain on the actual 
grid resources. 
 
In the case of solar energy, each individual solar panel installation becomes an energy 
provider. Thus, the system transitions from centralized with a single energy provider to 
decentralized with multiple providers. Not surprisingly, the centralized OPA was hesitant to give 
up its monopolistic power. As explained by one participant: “If you’re used to a central power 
17	  
system and you are the monopoly holder, then your life is comfortable because you have perfect 
control, you’re the only entity.” 
 A second and related reason for limited grid capacity discussed by participants was 
resource constraints, especially related to technical, human, and knowledge constraints in the 
OPA. For example: 
The problem that I find here in Ontario is that when they developed the Green 
Energy Act, they didn’t really allocate the resources to go through that change 
which we all knew was hard but nobody expected it to be disastrous. There is a lack 
of human resources even to process the paperwork; there is a lack of technical 
resources out in the field to do the grid. 
 
The participants also found it difficult to understand why resources were limited given that the 
issue of grid access is not unique to Canada:  
So what they say is that the theoretical disturbances that renewables may create in 
the grid are not that big and you can have at least 15 percent of renewables in any 
given grid. That is the minimum that they say that you can have. That is a 
theoretical thing that some engineers do in the world. If you go to a place like 
Germany or Spain that have been operating this kind of situation already for years, 
they have raised this bar to 30 percent. 
 
Perhaps most striking about this constraint was the extent to which it hurt the industry. 
The seven percent maximum restriction to grid access was quickly reached, and there were no 
proposals by the government to increase it. This meant that all companies we examined were 
running below capacity, and one company was forced to layoff over 70 employees and 
ultimately had to close during our study period. According to an exasperated participant: 
It was going to be a 400-megawatt [market] a year. That was the international 
predictions from sources, credible sources. That’s what everyone thought; it’s 
worth stepping into the market. We wanted 10 percent of the market share… this is 
a 50 megawatt facility and today, July 14, there are eight megawatts in operation. 
So that’s two per cent of the yearly projection. It’s not like you’re a bit off the 
estimate… it’s a complete failure…So there’s no real way for you to overcome 
these problems.  
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When the seven percent limit was reached, and thus became an institutional constraint, 
the nature of the legitimacy of the industry changed as well. Whether renewables should exceed 
this limit was questioned, and such questioning demonstrated a lack of cognitive legitimacy for 
industry expansion beyond the seven percent limit (Meyer & Scott, 1983; Suchman, 1995).  
There was no longer pragmatic legitimacy for the installation of more solar panels tied to the grid 
because consumers could not sell excess power back to the grid. However, moral legitimacy did 
persist because solar energy could help alleviate continuing societal concerns about the 
environment and employment.  
Political uncertainty. Our first wave of interviews was conducted in Summer 2011, the 
quarter preceding the provincial election. At that time, voters appeared equally split between the 
two main parties who had opposing views of the renewable energy industry. In particular, the 
incumbent Liberals promised to redouble their renewable energy efforts and to maintain the 
GEA, whereas the opposition Conservatives promised to repeal the GEA. Although it was 
possible that the program would only change in name and details, our participants viewed this as 
a serious threat to the viability of their businesses. One participant stated bluntly: “And of course 
then you’ve got the election in the Fall right? That’s going to mess things up.” 
 Politicians introduced a new level of uncertainty that represented a dramatic institutional 
constraint. For example, investors hesitated to invest further, and customers were unwilling to 
purchase and install solar panels. A participant noted that: “The opposition making statements 
about the industry before the election…that puts everything on hold. If he (Mike Hudak, 
Conservative party leader) says in six months, ‘What I want, is to stop all this’, no one’s going to 
do anything.” The uncertain future of the GEA was also widely covered in the media, and 10 
articles focused on this issue (e.g., Wolfson, 2011b). 
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 This politicizing of solar energy created confusion because political party platforms 
profiled in the media referenced differing data with conflicting results. Seemingly easy questions 
to answer, such as the cost to consumers and the province, the number of jobs created, and the 
amount of power produced, became enigmas that generated uncertainty:  
When people say, what’s the cost to create these green energy jobs? There are 17 
different numbers out there. That’s when the government is in a number of these 
initiatives and is not fact-based, or not transparent, it’s very hard to actually 
validate or debug myths. 
 
Although the Liberal party that was pro-GEA was re-elected in Fall 2011, the second 
wave of interviews conducted in Fall 2012 highlighted a continuing political uneasiness. High 
profile media coverage of rising electricity rates following the introduction of higher priced 
green energy development created pressure for the Liberal government to decrease the FIT rate 
for solar and wind energy. Subsequently, the rate for solar rooftop panels that generate less than 
10 kWh (kilowatt hour) of energy, such as those on residences, was reduced from 80.2 ¢/kWh to 
the current 54.9 ¢/kWh. Consequently, it became less lucrative to invest in these panels based on 
profits from selling the energy to the grid (Beneteau, 2011). The media reported: 
The local solar industry said reducing the price of solar production won’t kill the 
market, but might slow its growth. “There are two components: one is the return on 
the investment and other is being able to obtain financing,” local lawyer and solar 
investor Paul Mullins said. “Obtaining financing will be difficult.” (Wolfson, 
2011c).  
 
Many interviewees reported that political decisions based on short-term political 
maneuvering were not in the best interest of business or the long-term interest of the province. A 
solar panel manufacturer said: 
…this should not be a political debate. The energy model of a country is just as 
important as the army or foreign relations or health or education, and you can’t 
change those things every four years. You can tweak it, you can modify things in 
the plan, but you need to have a long-term commitment to change these things. The 
grid is going to last 20-30 years. Generation investment is for 20-30 years. We 
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can’t depend on elections every four years. If kids go to school for 12 years, you 
can’t change the education every four years. You can’t debate every four years if 
you want to have an army or not…there are certain things that shouldn’t be 
debated. So that is the biggest hindrance for this industry—is the political debate 
before elections.  
 
In the media, a local landowner whose family had farmed the land for generations noted 
that political comments about ending the green energy deals were ‘‘very frightening to people in 
the county” because farmers were eager to host wind turbines and solar panels (Cross, 2011a).  
 In spite of the political uncertainty, there was considerable public sentiment that green 
energy was important and should be addressed by the politicians. This sentiment included the 
business community, as evident from a membership survey by the local Chamber of Commerce: 
Not surprisingly a plan for jobs and economic growth were at the top of the list. Also 
near the top of the list was energy/power – supply, cost and reliability. This was 
interesting because the energy/power issue did not show up in the federal election just a 
few months ago or in the municipal election last year (Jones, 2011).  
 
With the appearance of these institutional constraints, industry participants responded 
with four ingenious strategies. We now address these in the order in which they appeared.  
Ingenuity Strategies 
Ingenuity was evident in the interviews with all 22 participants. The ingenuity theme was coded 
59 times, 34 of which were about the formation of collaborations and 25 about innovative 
products and markets. In the media data, the ingenuity theme was coded 36 times in our 91 
articles, with 19 articles discussing collaborations and 17 discussing innovative products and 
markets. We identified four types of ingenuity strategies: 1) constraint-challenging multi-
stakeholder collaborations, 2) constraint-escaping new product and market development, 3) 
constraint-complying new product partnerships, and 4) constraint-escaping new product 
partnerships.  
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Constraint-challenging multi-stakeholder collaborations. We identified the formation of 
multi-stakeholder collaborations to challenge the institutional constraints as the first ingenuity 
strategy. This strategy is consistent with past research that has found stakeholders can drive 
change through the formation of collaborations (DiMaggio, 1998; Dorado, 2005; Reay & 
Hinings, 2009). We follow Oliver (1991) and use the term challenge, because our sample of 
participants consistently challenged the rationality of the two identified institutional constraints. 
In both the interviews and media data we found “unequivocal rejection of institutional norms and 
expectations;” interviewees’ willingness to share frustrations with the public and us represented a 
belief that they had “little to lose by displaying their antagonism toward the constituents that 
judge or oppose them” (Oliver, 1991, p. 157). Rejection and antagonism were apparent in the 
first few minutes of our interviews (in a number of cases participants were visibly disturbed), and 
by the frequent diatribes in the media by people baffled by the two identified institutional 
constraints. Media articles in just one week reflected this frustration in their titles, for example: 
“Making pollution cheaper for everyone” (Heartfield, 2011); “Those 200 jobs are a pathetic 
ransom” (Fuschi, 2011); “Green energy sector frets over vote” (Hall, 2011b); and “No need for 
more tax in Ontario” (Sterling, 2011). We suggest that the willingness of stakeholders to 
challenge the institutional constraints led them to form collaborations that were viewed as a 
legitimate way to challenge constraints. As expressed by one participant:  
“…if you work together, we’re all in the same boat, we’re here together. If the political 
environment changes, it changes for everybody. Like if we try to stand up and say 
something to the government, [it’s better] if we have a united voice than if we do it 
individually.” 
 
Through collaborations, diverse and sometimes competing stakeholders ingeniously 
combined their resources to resist and influence the institutional constraints, mobilizing their 
resources in an attempt to drive institutional change (Dorado, 2005). For instance, an ad hoc 
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collaboration of stakeholders planned to spend $10,000 on advertising to educate the public 
about solar options and their economic impact (Wolfson, 2012b). Individually, few stakeholders 
had sufficient resources for such informational advertising, such as the self-employed installer of 
solar panels whom we interviewed. Another example included scientists and green energy 
officials gathered at the local university to discuss system connection constraints and how to 
lobby for change (Wolfson, 2011a). Lastly, a compelling example of a multi-stakeholder 
collaboration described by Battagello (2011a) in The Windsor Star was an unexpected alliance of 
interests between business and environmentalists.  
Greenpeace Canada and a local solar panel company unveiled a mock memorial cemetery 
Wednesday to signify the death of green energy jobs across Ontario if Conservative 
Leader Tim Hudak is elected premier Oct. 6. 
 
Building on the global growth of associations and trade fairs like Intersolar, emerging 
Ontario associations extended membership to an expanded renewables ecosystem including 
investors, economic development agencies, and labor unions. The inclusion of such third-party 
stakeholders contributed to building the industry’s legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). For 
example, these associations were able to commission independent studies to provide unbiased 
information to the public and government on the Ontario solar industry. One CEO expressed a 
need for an even greater and more powerful association that could be instrumental in forming a 
national energy policy that overcame political barriers and constraints: “What we very much 
need is a national energy policy…We need something that can bridge these four year election 
cycles that make it such a political issue.” 
 Particularly ingenious about the collaborations were their dissemination strategies. For 
example, when using the media to convey information to the general public, the collaborations 
would frequently discuss the issue of job creation, which was highly salient given the province’s 
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reliance on the struggling manufacturing sector. Investment in renewable forms of energy and 
solar in particular were promoted as a way to create jobs. Our participants described how 
collaborations allowed them to express their frustration at how the limited access to the power 
grid stifled job creation and created layoffs. The Windsor Star, sensitive to job creation and the 
stimulation of the economy, often clearly sided with solar companies and their ability to create 
jobs. For example, this editorial voiced strong opinions against the government that was 
portrayed as the cause of the layoffs and reduced work: 
The high cost of energy is related to old delivery systems and a failure to maintain 
infrastructure. It’s the bitter pill Ontarians have had to swallow because of a series of bad 
moves that occurred under both the Tories and the Liberals (Beneteau, 2011).  
 
The Windsor Star also frequently interviewed frustrated front-line employees who openly 
expressed their anger at the situation (e.g., Wolfson, 2011e). Local greenhouse growers also 
joined the renewables chorus. Constrained by inadequate power grid capacity, they lobbied 
heavily for a new power line that would allow them to move forward with 500 more acres under 
glass (Cross, 2011b).  
As has been found in research examining institutional entrepreneurship (Creed et al. 
2002; Lounsbury et al. 2003; Rao 1998), stakeholders legitimized their grievances against the 
institutional constraints by framing them within popular social discourses, thus furthering their 
moral legitimacy.  
In sum, collaborations effectively used the media to garner public support and challenge 
the institutional constraints. Collaborations required a relatively small commitment of 
organizational resources, as firms tried to alter the constraints while operating as usual. Uniting 
with multiple stakeholders imaginatively brought together resources to enter a new domain of 
action: political activity to alter constraints (Lampel et al., 2011). Ultimately, however, this 
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strategy was unsuccessful at changing the institutional constraints. This is graphically portrayed 
in Figure 1 by the thick arrow that is rebuffed by the institutional constraints.  
Constraint-escaping new product and market development. With the failure of the first 
ingenuity strategy, a second strategy quickly emerged, constraint-escaping new product and 
market development. It was here that we witnessed internal transitions within individual firms. 
They recognized both the severity of the constraints and their inability to alter them. In response, 
they began to create ingenious solutions to adapt to the constraints and enter new domains of 
action. We follow Oliver (1991) and use the term escape to refer to firms changing activities and 
domains (Thompson, 1967). Entrepreneurs recognized the difficulty in changing constraints and 
so developed customized products and niche markets that represented the internal organizational 
change needed to survive the institutional environment. 
This strategy emerged in 2010, but it accelerated between the summer of 2011 and the 
summer of 2012. A number of companies developed a variety of products that functioned 
independent of grid access. For example, an entrepreneur proudly announced that his company 
had developed a solar kiosk/bar that provided refrigeration and did not require access to the 
power grid. Solar-powered golf carts were sold to a local golf course, creating 10 full-time jobs 
and the installation of a 125-kilowatt rooftop project (Wolfson, 2012a). Other interesting 
examples were a solar cooker (Wolfson, 2012b) and a solar recharging station and bench for 
smartphones and laptops (Schmidt, 2012).  
The constrained local market also prompted local entrepreneurs to consider export 
opportunities and new markets. For example, a solar-powered pump targeting the African market 
was developed (Wolfson, 2012a). In addition, two media articles (Battagello, 2011b; Hall, 
2011d) and two CEOs (one in the first round of interviews and one in the second round) 
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discussed newly developed products by local manufacturers that specifically targeted the 
adjacent United States market for sales while avoiding the constraints imposed in the Ontario 
market. One CEO of a local solar panel manufacturer summarized his strategy:  
…because no one can get connected, there’s no demand domestically in the province. 
Now you have your export, that’s where the future truly is. That’s where we’re looking at 
right now; we’re marketing down in the States a lot.  
 
While the second ingenuity strategy was being developed and implemented, stakeholders 
continued to use the first ingenuity strategy and challenged the institutional constraints, albeit 
unsuccessfully. Without the second ingenuity strategy, organizations were not likely to survive, 
as evidenced by an international company that was forced to shut down. Their seven million 
dollar plant was closed in Spring 2012, and nearly 100 employees lost their jobs. This plant was 
the only one to fail in our study, and the company was quick to blame limited access to the grid 
as the reason for their closure. In contrast, the government (both the provincial finance minister 
and the city’s mayor were interviewed in the article) blamed the company for its lack of 
competitiveness (Schmidt & Hall, 2012).  
Indeed, the remaining Ontario-based companies exercised ingenuity that enabled them to 
circumvent the constraints. We depict this ingenious adaptation with a thick arrow in Figure 1 
that goes around the top down constraints. In terms of Lampel et al. (2011), this appears to be 
what they called bypassing constraints, a topic that received limited attention in the call for 
papers compared to changing the institutional constraints or adapting to the constraints.  
 Constraint-complying new product partnerships. We subsequently observed a third 
ingenuity strategy, which was the development of new product partnerships that found niches 
within the Ontario power grid. We use Oliver’s (1991, p. 153) term complying in this ingenuity 
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strategy because the partners acquiesced to the institutional constraints while “consciously and 
strategically” complying in anticipation of “self-serving benefits”. 
 There were a few examples of this strategy. One was a partnership between a solar 
energy start-up company and the University of Windsor who together worked to develop a new 
system that automatically shut off power from traditional energy sources when solar power was 
being produced (Macaluso, 2012). It was estimated that the new system could reduce electricity 
bills by as much as 70 per cent. Another constraint-complying strategy emerged when a solar 
startup CEO and a solar aggregator agreed to partner to overcome limited grid access by paying 
for their own upgrades to the power lines to a decentralized energy system. The upgraded power 
lines represented a form of new product development. Notably, no organization could implement 
this ingenious solution on its own; instead, our participants were willing to pool limited 
organizational resources and jointly incur short-term costs for long-term gain (Wolfson, 2011d).  
This third ingenuity strategy was innovative because it used constraint-complying new 
product development in partnerships, a type of organization that was new to the participants 
(Rogers, 1983; Schumpeter, 1986). This is depicted by thick arrows in Figure 1 with the strategy 
incorporating both bottom-up ingenuity and top-down constraints. Moreover, this opportunity-
based approach combined the original compliance strategy with the collaborative strategy they 
displayed as the seven percent cap began to threaten their survival. The thinner arrows in Figure 
1 represent this synthesis of previous strategies. Stakeholders learned that collaborations could 
be effective when combined with compliance instead of challenge.  
Constraint-escaping new product partnerships. The final ingenuity strategy we observed 
again involved elements of previous strategies; here, partnerships developed new products that 
enabled firms to escape the constraints (Oliver, 1991). For example, a solar panel manufacturer 
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joined with a company that made ground-mounted solar systems that would reduce labor costs 
by as much as 90 percent and increase efficiency to the point where “our first system was 
shipped, installed and commissioned all on the same day” (Hall, 2012). This partnership reduced 
the political uncertainty by driving down costs making the use of solar panels more economically 
legitimate. A second example of this strategy was a partnership between a local solar 
manufacturer and a collaboration of researchers at the University of Windsor who together 
developed a grid-independent solar carport (Wright, 2011).  
From the second ingenuity strategy that appeared in 2010, stakeholders had learned an 
effective means to get around the institutional constraints, namely, by developing new, grid-
independent products and extending into markets outside of Ontario. Moreover, since we found 
evidence of collaborations as early as 2009, it makes sense that by 2012 the greater 
connectedness among stakeholders would bear new fruit. Accordingly, by 2012 the final 
ingenuity strategy became apparent, and it combined the effective escape tactic from the second 
ingenuity strategy with developing partnerships that first began to form in the first ingenuity 
strategy. Once again, the thinner arrows in Figure 1 represent this synthesis of previous 
strategies. And as shown by the thick arrow in Figure 1, this strategy was effective at 
circumventing the institutional constraints.  
Ingenuity and legitimacy. Although our first identified ingenuity strategy was not 
successful at complying with or escaping the constraints, our second, third and fourth ingenuity 
strategies were. Part of their success was that stakeholders were able to extend their existing 
stock of legitimacy to the new products and markets resulting from the strategies (Ashforth & 
Gibbs, 1990). The ability of solar panels to provide electric power to customers who were not 
connected to the Ontario power grid demonstrated pragmatic legitimacy. Stakeholders also built 
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on a base of regulative and moral legitimacy established by the politicians and the public by 
developing products that did not contravene the regulations, by continuing to position these 
products as ‘green,’ and by continuing to provide jobs in an area hard hit by the decline in the 
automobile industry. Moreover, these new products did not require government subsidies, an 
issue that before had raised considerable questions from politicians and in the media (Sterling, 
2011). No media articles questioned the new products or markets, suggesting cognitive 
legitimacy (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Meyer & Scott, 1983). Lastly, we found that when an 
individual firm extended legitimacy to its new products or markets, the legitimacy of the entire 
industry benefited. That is, through firm-level and partnership-level ingenuity strategies, the 
industry garnered legitimacy by demonstrating independence of government subsidies and the 
grid, thus demonstrating a free-market approach.  
 
Contributions and Implications  
 Research. Scholarly work on new constructs usually includes the important work of 
enhancing the clarity of definitions and measures (Kaplan, 1964; Suddaby, 2010a). Our first 
contribution to research is enhancing the conceptual clarity of the construct of ingenuity. We 
found that ingenuity strategies could be usefully framed using Oliver’s (1991) responses to 
institutional processes, in our case, compliance, challenge, and escape. Two implications for 
future research are seeing if these three responses appear in other settings and if other responses 
elaborated by Oliver (1991) are useful for classifying ingenuity.  
 Past research on institutions and institutional entrepreneurship recommends greater 
attention to bottom-up processes of institutional creation (Scott, 1994; Suddaby, 2010b) and to 
dynamic models of how institutions form, change, and decline (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; 
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Greenwood et al., 2002; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007). Our second contribution is inducing a 
process model of bottom-up ingenuity in response to top-down institutional pressures. We found 
that ingenuity developed over time in a sequence of strategic responses characterized by 
challenge, escape, compliance, and escape. Future research might investigate how organizational 
ingenuity unfolds over time in other industries, the different strategies employed, and the 
sequence in which they are manifested. 
Legitimacy is necessary for surviving in strong institutional environments (Greenwood et 
al., 2002; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), such as those where ingenuity is needed. Our third 
contribution is showing how industry participants capitalized on existing stocks of legitimacy in 
developing their ingenuity strategies, specifically how pragmatic, regulative, moral, and 
cognitive legitimacy applied to them. Our research using different dimensions of legitimacy 
further develops the claim that changes can be legitimized by framing them within popular 
discourses (Creed et al., 2002; Deephouse, 1996; Lounsbury et al., 2003; Perkmann & Spicer 
2007; Rao 1998). The relationship between different types of ingenuity and different dimensions 
of legitimacy over time should be examined further in other contexts.  
A central question for research on ingenuity is: “Under what conditions does 
organizational ingenuity emerge?” (Lampel et al., 2011, p. 459). Our fourth contribution is 
identifying one condition when ingenuity emerged, specifically, when an institutional enabler 
became an institutional constraint. This occurred even though the institution itself, the GEA, did 
not change. Instead, successful entrepreneurial innovation quickly filled the capacity of the 
renewable energy market in Ontario. At this point, innovation took place within institutional 
constraints, consistent with the definition of ingenuity (Lampel et al., 2011).  
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Past research has shown that collaborations are important in driving institutional change 
(Dorado, 2005; Greenwood et al., 2002; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007; Reay & Hinings, 2009), and 
we found collaborations in the Ontario solar energy industry. What makes this a contribution is 
the speed at which they appeared; collaborations began to form within the first year of the 
introduction of the GEA. The rapid appearance of collaborations was unexpected, based on past 
theorizing about legitimacy in embryonic industries by Aldrich and Fiol (1994, p. 655): 
“Collective action is extremely difficult to organize early in the life of an industry due to free 
rider problems.” We propose that collaborations in embryonic industries happen faster when 
institutional constraints are stronger; future research could test this proposition. 
 Policy. The implications of this study for the Ontario solar industry are dramatic. Without 
changes to the current institutional constraints the industry is unlikely to grow beyond its current 
form and a promising opportunity for clean energy, investment, and job creation will be lost. 
Firms are looking outside of Ontario to expand and to stay in business, and the firm of one of our 
interview participants was forced to close. Further, Ontario will not reduce dependence on fossil 
fuels, an important topic for policy makers and researchers alike (CBC News, 2011; Okereke, 
Wittneben, & Bowen, 2012; Wittneben, Okereke, Banerjee, & Levy, 2009). 
Currently, according to recent REN 21 Renewables Global Status Reports, North 
American solar companies lag behind global solar competitors (Sawin 2011; 2012). Our 
interviewees consistently demonstrated a strong grasp of the global solar industry, market and 
stakeholders. All participants acknowledged that they sought out innovation overseas, primarily 
in Europe. This echoes a recent report by IHS Emerging Energy Research (2011) that notes 
“Europe has become the testing ground for the latest generation of solar technologies including 
thermal storage, CPV [concentrated photovoltaics], and innovative PV [photovoltaics] 
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technologies.” This should be of particular concern to the Canadian government as the GEA was 
created to spur innovation within the province and potentially be the first of many Acts for the 
rest of Canada. With the seven percent grid restriction, our participants indicated that many 
people (such as investors, customers, engineers) were unwilling to invest resources in Canada.  
 Our study highlights a need for all relevant stakeholders, including private, public and 
non-profit entities, to be at the policy table if sustainable climate change policies are to be 
successfully introduced (Okereke et al., 2012). This is consistent with past research that has 
found that such multi-stakeholder partnerships are essential to address existing regulatory, 
participation, resource and learning gaps (Pinkse & Kolk, 2012; Wijen & Ansari, 2007). 
 Managers. In the Ontario solar industry, the seven percent restriction changed from 
enabling to constraining within less than one year. Managers should be aware of how quickly 
such a change can occur so they might preemptively strike at the institutional constraints.  
 It is not surprising that the first ingenuity strategy (constraint-challenging multi-
stakeholder collaborations) represented a relatively small transition within the organizations we 
studied. Essentially, stakeholders sought to change the constraints with minimal investment and 
by continuing business as usual (making solar panels for the Ontario market that required grid 
access). It makes sense for organizational stakeholders to first seek to change constraints with a 
minimal commitment of resources. What is important for managers is that within one year, the 
firms that survived in our sample realized that this strategy was not effective and rapidly 
changed. At this point they were forced to commit significant resources to develop new products 
that could sell independent of grid access. Thus managers must quickly surmise the severity of 
the constraints and their ability to alter them and exercise the appropriate ingenuity strategy. Our 
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study delineated one way for organizations to change and step around severe institutional 
constraints by developing new products and markets, sometimes in partnership with others. 
 
Limitations 
The qualitative nature of our study limits its literal generalization beyond the context of the solar 
industry in Ontario. However, it provides insight about an embryonic industry that could be a 
benchmark to others, namely in examining the role of ingenuity, institutional constraints and 
legitimacy in embedded agency and in the process of institutional change. Future researchers 
might examine other industries to see how the process differs, including additional ingenuity 
strategies that emerge under different institutional constraints.  
Furthermore, the industry is highly concentrated in the southern part of Ontario, and 
correspondingly this was our main area of investigation. Most of our interviewees lived there, 
and our media data were obtained from a single source. Future research could investigate if 
similar findings emerge in other places where solar energy is being developed and where 
ingenuity in the face of institutional constraints is exercised.  
Lastly, we defined organizational ingenuity as an ability, yet we were only able to 
observe its outcomes. Similar concerns have existed for other constructs, like dynamic 
capabilities and agility. As this new construct of organizational ingenuity is further developed, 
future research will need to tease out its nature as trait, skill, action, or outcome. 
 
Conclusion 
We used a case study of the Ontario solar energy industry to build theory on the emerging 
construct of organizational ingenuity (Eisenhardt, 1989; Lampel et al., 2011). Because ingenuity 
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takes place within institutional constraints (Lampel et al., 2011), we used institutional theory to 
orient our research (Suddaby, 2006). Our research question asked about the role of 
organizational ingenuity in the paradox of embedded agency (Seo & Creed, 2002). We induced a 
process model of ingenuity that incorporated top-down pressure at the industry level manifested 
by institutional constraints and bottom-up change at the firm level (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; 
Greenwood et al., 2002; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007; Scott, 1994; Suddaby, 2010b). We found that 
severe top-down constraints lead to a set of bottom-up ingenuity strategies that challenged, 
complied with, or escaped the constraints. These ingenuity strategies were manifested at multiple 
levels of analysis, and firms were able to extend different dimensions of legitimacy to the 
strategies. Hence, when confronted by significant institutional constraints, we conclude that 
firms can circumvent these constraints ingeniously and legitimately. 
 
 
 
  
34	  
References 
Aldrich, H. E., & Fiol, C. M. (1994). Fools rush in? The institutional context of industry 
creation. Academy of Management Review, 19, 645–670. 
Amabile, T., Conti, R., Coon, H., Lazenby, J., & Herron, M. (1996). Assessing the work 
environment for creativity. Academy of Management Journal, 39, 1154-1184. 
Ashforth, B., & Gibbs, B. (1990). The double-edge of organizational legitimation. Organization 
Science, 1, 177-194. 
Bansal, P., & Clelland, I. (2004). Talking trash: Legitimacy, impression management, and 
unsystematic risk in the context of the natural environment. Academy of Management 
Journal, 47, 93-103. 
Barley, S., & Tolbert, P. (1997). Institutionalization and structuration: Studying the links 
between action and institution. Organization Studies, 18, 93–117. 
Barron, D. M. (1998). Pathways to legitimacy among consumer loan providers in New York 
City, 1914–1934. Organization Studies, 19, 207–33. 
Battagello, D. (2011a). Greenpeace calls Hudak a job killer. The Windsor Star, September 29, 
2011. 
Battagello, D. (2011b). Local firm expanding. The Windsor Star, October 11, 2011. 
Beneteau, M (2011). School board puts solar panels on hold. The Windsor Star, November 3, 
2011. 
Brown, N., & Deegan, C. (1998). The public disclosure of environmental performance 
information– a dual test of media agenda setting theory and legitimacy theory. 
Accounting and Business Research, 29, 21–41. 
CBC News. (2011). Canada’s power grid needs $293 billion infusion: report. April 7, 2011. 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2011/04/06/canada-power-grid-investment.html.  
Creed, W. E. D., Scully, M.A., & Austin, J. R. (2002) .Clothes make the person: The tailoring of 
legitimating accounts and the social construction of identity. Organization Science, 13(5): 
475-496. 
Cross, B. (2011a). 3 battle for Crozier’s crown. The Windsor Star, September 30, 2011. 
Cross, B. (2011b). Duncan sparks power line review: 1000 jobs in jeopardy. The Windsor Star, 
November 26, 2011. 
Deephouse, D. (1996). Does isomorphism legitimate? Academy of Management Journal, 39, 
1024-1039. 
Deephouse, D. L., & Suchman, M. (2008). Legitimacy in organizational institutionalism. In R. 
Greenwood, C. Oliver, R. Suddaby, & K. Sahlin (Eds.), The Sage handbook of 
organizational institutionalism (pp. 49-77). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
DiMaggio, P. (1988). Interest and agency in institutional theory. In L. G. Zucker (Ed.), 
Institutional patterns and organizations: Culture and environment (pp. 3-21). Cambridge, 
MA: Ballinger. 
35	  
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48, 147-
160. 
Dorado, S. (2005). Institutional entrepreneurship, partaking and convening. Organization 
Studies, 26, 385–414. 
Drori, I., & Honig, B. (2013). A process model of internal and external legitimacy. Organization 
Studies, 34, 345–376. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management 
Review, 14, 532-550. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. (2007). Theory building from cases: Opportunities and 
challenges. Academy of Management Journal, 50, 25-32. 
Fuschi, R. (2011). Those 200 jobs are a pathetic ransom. The Windsor Star, September 24, 2011. 
Garud, R., Jain, S., & Kumaraswamy, A. (2002). Institutional entrepreneurship in the 
sponsorship of common technological standards: The case of Sun Microsystems and 
Java. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1), 196–214. 
Garud, R., Hardy, C., & Maguire, S. (2007). Institutional entrepreneurship as embedded agency: 
An introduction to the special issue. Organization Studies, 28, 957–969. 
Goldman, S.L., Nagel, R.N., & Preiss, K. (1995). Agile Competitors and Virtual Organizations. 
New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. 
Greenwood, R., Suddaby, R., & Hinings, C. R. (2002). Theorizing change: The role of 
professional associations in the transformation of institutionalized fields. Academy of 
Management Journal, 45, 58-80. 
Hall, D. (2011a). Unconquered-sustainable deal reduces cost of solar systems. The Windsor Star, 
June 16, 2011. 
Hall, D. (2011b). Green energy sector frets over vote. The Windsor Star, September 24, 2011. 
Hall, D. (2011c). Windsor Islamic centre to produce solar power. The Windsor Star, October 5, 
2011.  
Hall, D. (2011d). Renewable energy brighter after vote: Many local firms are expanding. The 
Windsor Star, October 15, 2011.  
Hall, D. (2012). Solar tech company, golf club partner up. The Windsor Star, May 17, 2012.  
Heartfield K. (2011). Making pollution cheaper for everyone. The Windsor Star, September 26, 
2011.  
Heugens, P. P. M. A. R., & Lander, M. W. (2009). Structure! Agency! (and other quarrels): A 
meta-analysis of institutional theories of organization. Academy of Management Journal, 
52, 61-85. 
IHS Emerging Energy Research. (2011). U.S. solar power: Markets and strategies 2011-2025. 
June 2011, 207 pp. Accessed July 22, 2011 at www.emerging-energy.com. 
Jarvis, A. (2011). Hudak can’t talk the talk, PC leader wouldn’t answer biggest question in 
Windsor, Essex County. The Windsor Star, September 15, 2011. 
36	  
Jarzabkowski, P. (2004). Strategy as practice: Recursiveness, adaptation, and practices-in-use. 
Organization Studies, 25: 529-560. 
Jones, J. (2011). Chamber issues: Job creation and growth. The Windsor Star, September 26, 
2011.  
Kaplan A. 1964. The conduct of inquiry. Chandler: New York. 
Lamertz, K., & Baum, J. A. C. (1998). The legitimacy of organizational downsizing in 
Canada:An analysis of explanatory media accounts. Canadian Journal of Administrative 
Sciences, 15, 93–107. 
Lampel, J., Honig, B., & Drori, I. (2011). Discovering creativity in necessity: Organizational 
ingenuity under institutional constraints. Organization Studies, 32, 458-460. 
Langley, A. (1999). Strategies for theorizing from process data. Academy of Management 
Review, 24, 691-710. 
Lawrence, T. B., & Suddaby, R. (2006). Institutions and institutional work. In S. R. Clegg, C. 
Hardy, T. B. Lawrence, & W. R. Nord (Eds.) Handbook of organization studies, 2nd 
Edition (pp. 215-254). London: Sage. 
Lounsbury, M., Ventresca, M. J., & Hirsch, P. (2003). Social movements, field frames, and 
industry emergence. Socio-Economic Review, 1(1), 71–104. 
Lu, Y., & Ramamurthy, K. (2011). Understanding the link between information technology 
capability and organizational agility: An empirical examination. MIS Quarterly, 35, 931-
954. 
Macaluso, G. (2011). Chrysler warehouse to bolster region’s tax base: Pillette site reborn. The 
Windsor Star, October 18, 2011.  
Macaluso, G. (2012). ‘Switching’ to solar electricity. The Windsor Star, April 28, 2012. 
Margolis, J. D., & Molinsky, A. (2008). Navigating the bind of necessary evils: Psychological 
engagement and the production of interpersonally sensitive behavior. Academy of 
Management Journal, 51, 847-872. 
McAllister Opinion Research. (2010). The 2010 Global Thought Survey on Sustainability. 
Pembina Institute. June 24, 2010.  Accessed March 12, 2013 at 
http://www.pembina.org/pub/2040.  
Meyer, A. D. (1982). Adapting to environmental jolts. Administrative Science Quarterly, 27: 
525-537. 
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutional organizations: Formal structure as myth and 
ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340-363. 
Meyer, J. W. and W. R. Scott (1983). Centralization and the legitimacy problems of local 
government. In J. W. Meyer and W. R. Scott (eds.) Organizational environments: Ritual 
and rationality. Beverly Hills, CA, Sage: 199-215. 
Mezias, S. J. (1990). An institutional model of organizational practice: Financial reporting at the 
Fortune 200. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35: 431-457. 
Newspaper Audience Databank. (2012). http://nadbank.com/en/study/readership/totalweekly. 
37	  
Okereke, C., Wittneben, B., & Bowen, F. (2012). Climate Change: Challenging Business, 
Transforming Politics. Business & Society, 51, 7-30. 
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of Management 
Review, 16, 145–179. 
Ontario Ministry of Energy. (2012). http://www.energy.gov.on.ca/en/green-energy-act/.	  	  
Pearson, C. (2011). An autoworker’s green haven: Firm hires industry’s unemployed. The 
Windsor Star, September 19, 2011. 
Perkmann, M., & Spicer, A. (2007). Healing the scars of history: Projects, skills and field 
strategies in institutional entrepreneurship. Organization Studies, 28(07), 1101–1122. 
Pinkse, J. & Kolk, A. (2012). Addressing the Climate Change—Sustainable Development 
Nexus: The Role of Multi-stakeholder Partnerships. Business & Society, 51, 176-210. 
Postmedia News. (2011). Alternative to tapping into solar power. The Windsor Star, September 
17, 2011.  
Rao, H. (1998). Caveat emptor: The construction of nonprofit consumer watchdog organizations. 
American Journal of Sociology, 103(4), 912–961. 
Reay, T., & Hinings, C. R. (2009). Managing the rivalry of competing institutional logics. 
Organization Studies, 30, 629–652. 
Rogers, E. M. (1983). Diffusion of Innovations (3rd ed.). New York: Free Press.  
Roth, A. (1996). Achieving strategic agility through Economies of Knowledge. Strategy & 
Leadership, 24, 30 – 36. 
Sambamurthy, V., Bharadwaj, A., & Grover, V. (2003). Shaping agility through digital options: 
Reconceptualizing the role of information technology in contemporary firms. MIS 
Quarterly, 27, 237-263. 
Sawin, J. (2011). Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century: Renewables 2011 
Global Status Report. REN21 Secretariat, Paris, France. accessed October 3, 2011 at 
www.ren21.net.  
 
Sawin, J. (2012). Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century: Renewables 2012 
Global Status Report. REN21 Secretariat, Paris, France. accessed February 26, 2013 at 
www.ren21.net.  
Schmidt, D. (2012). Sit down and plug into the sun. The Windsor Star, September 28, 2012.  
Schmidt, D., & Hall, D. (2012). Solar tech manufacturer Siliken closes Windsor operations. The 
Windsor Star, May 11, 2012.  
Schumpeter, J. A. (1986). The process of creative destruction. In J. B. Barney & W. G. Ouchi 
(Eds.), Organizational economics (pp. 408-413). San Francisco CA: Jossey-Bass.  
Scott, R. W. (1994). Institutions and organizations: Toward a theoretical synthesis. In W. R. 
Scott, J. W. Meyer, and Associates (eds.), Institutional Environments and Organizations: 
Structural Complexity and Individualism. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage: 55–80.  
Scott, R. W. (2008). Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests. Sage Publications.  
38	  
Scully, M. & Meyerson, D. (1996). Before isomorphism: The dynamics of legitimation during 
implementation of corporate ethics programs. Working paper, Sloan, MIT, Cambridge, 
MA. 
Seo, M., & Creed, W. E. D. (2002). Institutional contradictions, praxis, and institutional change: 
A dialectical perspective. Academy of Management Review, 27, 222-247. 
Sorensen, C. (2012). Grey Skies for the Energy Industry. Macleans. July 10, 2012. Accessed 
March 15, 2012 at http://www2.macleans.ca/2012/07/10/solar-flame-out/ 
Strang, D. B., & Meyer J. W. B. (1993). Institutional conditions for diffusion. Theory and 
Society, 22(4), 487–511. 
Sterling, C. (2011). No need for more tax in Ontario. The Windsor Star, September 28, 2011. 
Strauss, A. L., & Corbin, J., 1998. Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and 
procedures for developing grounded theory, Sage, Thousand Oaks. 
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy 
of Management Review, 20, 571-610. 
Suddaby, R. (2006) From the editors: What grounded theory is not. Academy of Management 
Journal, 49 (4), 633-642.  
Suddaby R. (2010a). Editor's Comments: Construct Clarity in Theories of Management and 
Organization. Academy of Management Review, 35(3): 346-357. 
Suddaby, R. (2010b). Challenges for institutional theory. Journal of Management Inquiry. 19, 
14-20. 
Sull, D. (2010). Competing through organizational agility. McKinsey Quarterly, 1, 48-56.  
Thompson, J. D. (1967). Organizations in Action. New York, McGraw-Hill. 
Tolbert, P. S., & Zucker, L. G. (1996). The institutionalization of institutional theory. S. R. Clegg, 
C., Hardy, W. R. Nord, eds. Handbook of Organization Studies. Sage, London, UK (pp. 175-
190). 
Van de Ven, A. H. (1986). Central problems in the management of innovation. Management 
Science, 32(5), 590-607. 
Van de Ven, A. H. (2007). Engaged Scholarship: A Guide for Organizational and Social Research. 
Oxford UK, Oxford University Press. 
Van de Ven, A. H. & Poole, M. S. (1995). Explaining development and change in organizations. 
Academy of Management Review, 20, 510-540. 
Van Dijk, S., Berends, H., Jelinek, M., Romme, A.G. L., & Weggeman, M. (2011). Micro-
institutional affordances and strategies of radical innovation. Organization Studies, 32(11), 
1485-1513. 
Wijen, F., & Ansari, S. (2007). Overcoming inaction through collective institutional 
entrepreneurship: Insights from regime theory. Organization Studies, 28/7, 1079–1100. 
Wittneben, B., Okereke, C., Banerjee, B., & Levy, D. (2009). Climate change and the emergence 
of new organizational landscapes. Organizational Studies, 30, 1013-1014.  
39	  
Wolfson, M. (2011a). Green energy future ‘bright,’ Windsor conference hears. The Windsor 
Star, September 6, 2011. 
Wolfson, M. (2011b). Liberals, PCs spar over jobs, Hudak called threat to green sector. The 
Windsor Star, September 9, 2011.  
Wolfson, M. (2011c). Green Act changes spark fear. The Windsor Star, November 2, 2011. 
Wolfson, M. (2011d). Solar manufacturers take Hydro One to task. The Windsor Star, November 
12, 2011.  
Wolfson, M. (2011e). Solar future feared to be dimming: LaSalle firm lays off 20 employees. 
The Windsor Star, November 15, 2011.  
Wolfson, M. (2012a). Solar pump, cart spark interest: Local firm builds green exports. The 
Windsor Star, March 22, 2012.  
Wolfson, M. (2012b). Solar biz gets boost. The Windsor Star, June 23, 2012. 
Wright, R. (2011). Electric vehicle event in Windsor displays new technology. The Windsor Star, 
June 3, 2011. 
Yin, R.K. (2009). Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 4th Edition. Beverly Hills, CA. 
Sage. 
Zietsma, C., & Lawrence, T. B. (2010). Institutional work in the transformation of an 
organizational field: The interplay of boundary work and practice work. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 55, 189-221. 
40	  
TABLE 1: Interview Participants 
Organization Position 2011 2012 
Economic Development Corporation  VP Community Development  X 
Environmental Committee for National Union President  X 
Financial Aggregator and Renewable Energy Development 
Company 
CEO  X 
Institutional Renewable Energy Investor CEO  X X 
Local Community College  Renewable Energy Program Coordinator X  
Local Government Workforce Agency  Director of Development  X 
Local Government Workforce Agency  Executive Director  X 
Local Government Workforce Agency  Program Designer X  
Local Government Workforce Agency  Research and Trend Analyst  X 
Personnel Recruitment Firm Account Manager for the Energy Sector X  
Provincial Government Funding Agency: Green Technology 
and Innovation 
Business Development Manager  X 
Provincial Ministry of Economic Development and Trade	   Senior Advisor X X 
Provincial Ministry of Energy Senior Manager, Smart Grid and Network Policy  X 
Provincial Solar Association President and CEO X X 
Renewable Energy Technology Consulting Company  Director of Project Development and Management  X 
Solar Aggregator Managing Director and Founder X  
Solar PV Solutions  VP Sales  X 
Solar Panel Manufacturer General Manager for Canadian Operation X  
Solar Panel Manufacturer Founder and CEO X  
Solar Systems, Engineering and Design CEO and Founder X X 
Solar Technology Installer CEO and Founder X X 
Switchgear Manufacturer Founder and CEO X  
	  
  
41	  
FIGURE 1: Organizational Ingenuity in the Ontario Solar Energy Industry, 2009-12 
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